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Abstract 
This paper investigates the reliability of the stock market’s initial reaction to M&A 
announcements as a predictor of actual post-acquisition performance. The two prevailing 
methods for evaluating M&A performance are event studies (stock market-based 
measures) and accounting-based measures. The present study combines these two 
performance evaluation approaches in a single empirical examination. Both the post-
merger buy-and-hold abnormal returns and changes in ROA are used as actual post-
acquisition performance variables. The acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
around the announcement is used as the market predictor variable. An econometric model 
is employed to test the predictive power of the announcement-period CAR on the actual 
performance variables using a sample of 3,208 acquisitions by U.S. public companies from 
2010 to 2014. This paper’s main contribution lies both in its methodology and its findings: 
on the one hand, long-term market and accounting variables are used as dependent 
variables measuring post-acquisition performance. On the other hand, this paper finds that 
short-term CAR is not a good predictor of subsequent M&A performance. The results 
suggest that the acquirer’s prior M&A experience is a positive predictor of post-acquisition 
performance. 
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Glossary 
BHAR Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) is the difference between the 
realized buy-and-hold return and the normal buy-and-hold return. 
 
CAR Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the total of all abnormal returns. CAR 
is usually calculated over a small window of time. 
 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) is a 
measure of a company’s operating performance. 
 
EPS Earnings per share (EPS) is the value of a company’s profit per outstanding 
share of common stock. It is a profitability indicator. 
 
M&A Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) refers to the consolidation of two 
companies. The term encompasses various transactions, including mergers, 
acquisitions, and tender offers. 
 
P/B The price-to-book (P/B) ratio is used to compare a company's current 
market price to its book value. 
 
P/E The price/earnings (P/E) ratio is used for valuing companies and to find out 
whether they are overvalued or undervalued. 
 
ROA Return on assets (ROA) shows the percentage of profit a company earns in 
relation to its overall resources. 
 
ROE Return on equity (ROE) is a measure of financial performance / how 
effectively management is using assets to create profits. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions1 (M&A) have always been a popular business strategy for 
growth. In 2018, the total deal value of completed M&A deals in North America and 
Europe saw a 6.3% increase year-on-year reaching $3.6 trillion, as shown in Figure 1. In 
North America alone, M&A activity recorded its fourth consecutive year with a total deal 
value over $3 trillion, as illustrated in Figure 2. Still, there is ample empirical evidence 
suggesting that, contrary to its popularity, M&A does not always bring shareholder value. 
In fact, recent studies indicate that 53% of all M&A deals fail and are value-destroying 
(Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006; Marks 2011). This paradoxical situation has generated 
considerable interest among academics. Prior research has thoroughly investigated M&A 
performance (Pettway and Trifts 1985; Petmezas 2009; Changqi and Ningling 2010; 
Okpanachi 2010; Hankir et al. 2011; Selcuk and Yilmaz 2011) applying market-based 
returns and accounting variables to measure performance. Most studies have focused on 
explaining the variation in M&A performance based on different company characteristics. 
However, there has been little discussion about the relationship between the market’s initial 
reaction to a merger announcement and the actual post-merger performance. This 
information can be particularly valuable to investors who can then make asset allocation 
decisions accordingly and potentially profit in the cases when the market’s judgment about 
the merger success is wrong. 
                                                 
1 In this paper, the terms merger and acquisition are used interchangeably. 
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This paper investigates the reliability of the market’s initial reaction to M&A 
announcements as a predictor of post-acquisition performance. The success or failure of 
M&A deals to meet expectations depends to a great extent on how success and failure are 
defined. Despite the extensive research that exists on the topic, M&A performance remains 
a theoretically complex construct lacking a single, universal definition. To produce a 
definition for M&A success, the following two key elements need to be addressed: the 
performance approach and the time horizon. The two main approaches for gauging M&A 
performance are the stock market-based and the accounting-based approaches, with the 
former being employed by most empirical studies (Selcuk and Yilmaz 2011; Das and Kapil 
2012). Still, there is no consensus among scholars regarding which of the two approaches 
is a better measure of actual M&A performance. To maintain consistency with the two 
bodies of literature, this study uses both market returns and accounting measures to define 
actual acquisition performance. In addition to this, short-term window event studies, which 
use abnormal returns around the announcement as the dependent variable, have been the 
most frequently used performance evaluation method in current research. However, 
announcement-period abnormal returns are not used to gauge M&A performance in this 
paper, but they are used as the market’s judgment of acquisition success instead. In 
summary, this study classifies M&A deals as successful if there is (1) a realized positive 
three-year buy-and-hold-abnormal return (BHAR) or (2) a positive change in return on 
assets (ROA) for the bidder. ROA is identified as one of the most superior measures of 
operational success by the literature. BHAR is described as the success from an investment 
point of view. 
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A multiple linear regression model is employed to test the predictive power of the 
market’s initial judgment to the post-acquisition performance, which is measured by the 
BHAR and the change in ROA, as discussed above. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
for the acquiring company around the announcement day are used as the market predictor 
variable. The first regression model follows the market-based approach, using the post-
acquisition three-year BHAR as the dependent (actual performance) variable. The second 
model follows the accounting-based approach, using the percentage change in ROA (3rd 
year post vs. 3rd year pre-acquisition) as the actual performance variable. Using a sample 
of 3,208 domestic acquisitions by U.S. public companies from 2010 to 2014, this 
investigation finds consistent results from both regressions suggesting that the stock market 
over or under-reacts to M&A announcements. In other words, the market’s initial reaction 
will be either too positively or too negatively. This finding is consistent with the investor 
overconfidence hypothesis, which states that the market tends to overestimate future 
performance. The results of this empirical study also show that the acquiring company’s 
experience in completing M&A deals has a positive and significant effect on post-
acquisition performance. 
This paper’s main contribution lies both in its methodology and its findings: on the 
one hand, long-term market and accounting variables are used as dependent variables 
measuring post-acquisition performance. Very few studies use both these variables as 
measures of acquisition performance (Cording et al. 2010). Most studies employ 
announcement-period returns as the acquisition performance variable. However, the 
present study utilizes announcement-period returns as an independent variable measuring 
the market’s initial reaction. The primary rationale behind utilizing long-term data (three 
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years post-acquisition) is to capture the ultimate consequences of the acquisition, once the 
corporate integration procedures are over and the stock market has gone beyond the initial 
phase of “newly merged” companies. In such a way, applied evidence is more robust and 
indicates the final result of the M&A, whether it has indeed managed to influence financial 
results or market value after the M&A event has left the epicenter of attention. On the other 
hand, this paper finds that the stock market initially overreacts to M&A announcements. 
On an accounting basis, the analysis fails to find any statistically significant relationship 
between CAR at the announcement and changes in ROA after the acquisition. Evidence 
shows that the most significant and robust variable in the success of M&As from both the 
market and the accounting point of view is the buyer’s experience. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature 
on M&A performance. Section 3 provides a description of the data collection process, 
presents summary statistics, and describes the methodology followed. Section 4 presents 
the findings and interpretations of the parameters of interest. Section 5 concludes by 
discussing the implications of the results and proposes avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Measuring and explaining the wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
has attracted substantial interest in the finance literature. While M&A continues to be a 
popular growth strategy for companies, research suggests that such corporate actions do 
not always create value for the acquiring firm. Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006) mention 
that the failure rate is approximately 50%. On the other hand, the shareholders of acquired 
firms almost always enjoy substantial and positive short-term gains as a result of a merger 
(Fisher 1983; Agrawal and Jaffe 2000). 
There is great variation on the definition of M&A performance and its measurement 
(Zollo and Meier 2008; Marks and Mirvis 2011; Wang and Moini 2012). The existing 
literature suggests that there are two main approaches on evaluating the performance of 
M&A: the stock market-based approach and the accounting-based approach (Cording et al. 
2010; Selcuk and Yilmaz 2011; Wang and Moini 2012).  
Zollo and Meier (2008) analyze 88 empirical studies between 1970 and 2006 on a 
quest to determine the measurement approach used in most of the empirical studies. They 
identify five commonly used approaches for evaluating M&A performance: (1) event 
studies (stock market-based measures) both in the short run and long run; (2) accounting-
based measures; (3) managers’ subjective assessments; (4) expert informants’ assessment; 
(5) divesture. The majority of studies used either the short-term window event study 
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method or long-term accounting measures. Similarly, Cording et al. (2010) report that 92% 
of the empirical studies which they review used event study and accounting-based methods. 
The announcement-effect event study method is the prevailing method for 
evaluating M&A performance in empirical research (Pettway and Trifts 1985; Moeller et 
al. 2004; Petmezas 2009; Cording et al. 2010; Hankir et al. 2011). This market-based 
approach utilizes short-run abnormal returns around the announcement day to measure 
acquisition performance. Event studies are based on the premise of the efficient market 
hypothesis, which states that stock prices are an unbiased and rational reflection of the true 
firm value. Several authors have expressed doubts about this assumption, arguing that 
sometimes investors might not have access to all necessary information to act rationally. 
According to Selcuk and Yilmaz (2011), a drawback of this approach is that changes in 
market valuations at the time of a merger could reflect other factors and not only the 
benefits of an efficiently operating market. The authors also question the reliability of 
short-term event studies because the longer-term results are of greater importance, but 
changes in performance as a result of the acquisition may not materialize immediately. 
Accounting-based studies analyze accounting data to assess the wealth effects of 
mergers by testing for changes in the profitability of the involved firms. Specifically, 
studies that take this approach compare profitability measures before and after the M&A 
using parametric tests. Pre-tax cash flows and net income adjusted for size (divided by 
assets, sales, and equity) and industry trends are usually used as measures of profitability. 
One of the drawbacks of the accounting-based approach is that it relies on the assumption 
that companies’ published accounts are a true reflection of their financial position. Still, 
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companies can use creative accounting techniques, which can consequently affect the 
effectiveness of the accounting-based approach (Dickerson, Gibson, and Tsakalotos 1997). 
In a systematic review of past empirical studies on M&A performance, Das and 
Kapil (2012) categorized and grouped the most frequently used accounting and market 
measures of M&A performance. Some of the accounting measures include asset turnover, 
pre-tax operating margin, ROA, ROE, and sales growth. According to Das and Kapil 
(2012), profit level is a poor measure of performance due to the direct relationship with 
company size. Still, the authors report that in one of the studies, there was a significant 
improvement in the median profit level over a longer period after the acquisition compared 
to that of companies who did not engage in an acquisition (Das and Kapil 2012). Under 
market measures, Das and Kapil (2012) report that the acquirer’s long-term market 
performance (measured with BHAR), the acquirer’s short-term CAR, and the alpha from 
Fama-French’s three-factor model are all widely used as explanatory variables of M&A 
performance in empirical research. Other objective measures of M&A performance include 
the age of the firm, capital expenditure rate, deal value, and market share. Lastly, the 
authors state that the book to market ratio was found to be statistically significant as an 
explanatory variable to the acquirer’s long-term market return. 
According to Mueller (1977), return on equity is commonly used as a performance 
measure in accounting-based empirical studies. Moreover, the success of a merger, from 
the point of view of the acquiring firm’s shareholders, is related to the premium paid by 
the acquiring firm. Specifically, the lower the premium, the higher the probability that the 
acquirer’s shareholder gain from the acquisition. Fisher (1983) argues that gains to 
shareholders do not necessarily imply efficiency gains. Examination of stock returns for a 
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relatively brief period after a merger shows the market’s unbiased prediction of the effects 
of the merger and not the actual effects. 
Empirical M&A research suggests that some of the variables that can impact returns 
for acquiring firms include the method of payment, the acquirer’s book to market ratio, and 
size and type of target. Specifically, Loughran and Vijh (1997) show that cash payments 
systematically outperform stock payments. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) indicate that value 
acquirers outperform glamour acquirers. Moeller et al. (2004) find that small acquirers tend 
to perform better than large acquirers. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) indicate 
empirically that misvaluations in the stock market is a driver of M&A activity. A 
fundamental assumption in such studies is that markets are inefficient and, hence, some 
firms are valued incorrectly. Moreover, it is assumed that managers act rationally and can 
recognize misvalued firms as potential opportunities to make a profit. 
Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) claim that, in aggregate, abnormal returns for acquirers 
in the years following an acquisition are negative or, at best, not statistically different from 
zero. Conn et al. (2001) find a wide variation in acquisition performance at the firm level. 
Approximately 35-45% of acquiring firms attain positive returns two to three years after 
an acquisition, with a standard deviation of 10% around the mean return. Using a sample 
of 519 UK acquisitions, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) find that single hostile bids deliver 
higher post‐acquisition gains (over three years) to acquirer shareholders than friendly, 
white knight or multiple hostile bidders. In their analysis, the authors also include some 
firm-specific variables related to corporate governance structures and top management 
turnover. 
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Rosen (2006) finds that investors’ reactions to the announcement of a merger can 
be influenced by their overly optimistic beliefs about the prospects of the merger. This, in 
turn, can lead to merger momentum. In this framework, Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler 
(2007) document that investor sentiment (optimism) co-exists with managerial hubris. 
According to Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), merger activity peaks 
when market valuations are high. The authors also find that deals announced during hot 
merger markets deliver lower returns than those announced at different times. This finding 
provides evidence of long-run reversal. Finally, Gugler et al. (2012) report that the amounts 
of assets acquired are directly proportional while returns to acquirers are inversely 
proportional to market optimism. 
Overall, much literature exists with regard to M&A performance; however, few 
researchers specifically examine the relationship between the market’s initial reaction to a 
merger announcement and the realized performance of the merger in the long-run. Even 
less work does so empirically. A possible reason for the lack of literature on this topic is 
that there is no consensus among researchers regarding what qualifies as a definition and 
measurement of M&A performance. Additionally, scholars have not been able to make a 
judgment call about the time horizon to evaluate M&A performance. However, none of 
these issues imply that such a study is unfeasible. This paper contributes by combining the 
two most common methods of measuring M&A performance, namely the market and 
accounting-based approaches, in a single empirical examination. 
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Chapter 3 
Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
A sample of 3,208 domestic acquisitions by U.S. public companies spanning 
January 1st, 2010 – December 31st, 2014 is used in this analysis.2 The sample transactions 
are obtained from S&P Capital IQ and are selected based on the following criteria: (1) The 
acquirers must be publicly traded in a U.S. exchange; (2) Both bidding and target firms 
must be incorporated in the U.S.; (3) The total transaction value is greater than $USD 1 
million; (4) Acquirers are not financial institutions; and (5) Cross-border M&A deals are 
excluded to avoid contaminating information. The deal value and the number of 
acquisitions completed by the bidder in the three years prior to the takeover are also sourced 
from S&P Capital IQ and used as independent variables. Lastly, the acquirers’ SIC codes 
are extracted to classify the M&As in different industries. 
A standard event study is conducted to find the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
and the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for the acquirers. Abnormal returns are 
calculated according to the following market-adjusted model, using the Event Study 
Research Application by WRDS: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 (1) 
 
                                                 
2 The date range had to be defined to the 2010-2014 period to be within the Capital IQ data download limit. 
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where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return on company 𝑖 and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the CRSP value-weighted market return 
(market beta is assumed to be 1). An estimation window of 120 trading days prior to the 
event is used with a minimum number of 50 non-missing return observations. According 
to Brown and Warner (1985), this estimation window is sufficient for generating a 
benchmark for the calculation of the expected return and residual return variance. 
Additionally, a gap of 22 trading days (1 month in calendar days) is used between the end 
of the estimation window and the beginning of the event window, as shown in Figure 1. 
Cumulating abnormal returns across time yields CAR, which is calculated for the 
seven-day (-3, +3) period around the announcement day (day 0) of a takeover. The seven-
day CAR for bidders that acquired public and/or private U.S. targets over the 2010-2014 
period is used to evaluate the market’s initial reaction to the announcement of an M&A. 
BHAR is the difference between the realized buy-and-hold return and the normal buy-and-
hold return, and it is calculated for the three-year period following the acquisition. The 
three-year BHAR for the acquirer is used to evaluate the actual performance of the M&A. 
For each transaction, annual accounting data for the bidder firm was collected for 
three years prior and three years after the announcement date. Specifically, the acquirers’ 
net income and total assets are acquired from COMPUSTAT to calculate ROA (net 
income/total assets). Then, the percentage change between the ROA three years before and 
the ROA three years after the takeover is calculated. The % change in ROA (3rd year post 
vs. 3rd year pre-acquisition) is the second variable used in this study to evaluate the actual 
M&A performance. Previous studies suggest that at least two years of post-acquisition data 
are necessary to evaluate the performance of the M&A as changes may not materialize 
immediately (Selcuk and Yilmaz 2011). The acquirers’ revenue, EBITDA, total market 
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value, common/ordinary equity, common shares outstanding, and EPS (including 
extraordinary items) are also collected from COMPUSTAT and used to compute various 
independent variables. 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the seven-day and three-year returns, as well 
as for the total deal value and the buyer’s experience in M&A deals. The mean seven-day 
CAR for the acquiring companies in the sample is positive and equals 1.13%. This result 
can be explained by the investors’ sentiment theory, which predicts positive abnormal 
returns in the short-run. The average value of the M&A transactions in this sample is 
$576.91 million. Additionally, the bidders in the sample have an average experience of 4.5 
M&A deals over the three years prior to the announcement day of the acquisition under 
examination. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for accounting/financial data for the acquirers 
in the sample. Remarkably, average revenue for the bidders grows faster prior to the 
acquisition (24.01%) compared to after the acquisition (11.12%). The buyers’ EBITDA 
margin is 9.87%, on average, for the three-year period before the M&A but turns negative 
(-3.31%) for the three-year period after the M&A. Post-acquisition ROA and P/B values 
are also lower, on average, than pre-acquisition values. Still, the average P/E ratio is higher 
in the post-acquisition period. 
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3.3 Empirical Specification 
The objective of this paper is to test whether the stock market can predict the actual 
performance of an acquisition correctly at the announcement day. To test the null 
hypothesis that the market anticipates the prospects of M&A correctly, the following 
multiple linear regression model is considered: 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + ⋯ + 𝛽9𝑋9 + 𝜀𝑖 (2) 
 
where the dependent variable Actual Performance is the actual acquisition performance 
variable, CAR is the seven-day cumulative abnormal return for bidders and serves as the 
market predictor variable, and X2, X3, …, X9 are independent variables (see Table 3) that 
can help explain the actual M&A performance. 
A multiple regression model is employed to test the proposed hypothesis. Initially, 
the dependent (actual performance) variable is the three-year post-acquisition BHAR for 
the acquirer. However, as discussed in section 2, there is another body of literature that 
evaluates M&A performance using accounting measures instead of security returns. 
Therefore, to be consistent with the literature, a second regression model is adopted using 
the % change in ROA (3rd year post vs. 3rd year pre-acquisition) as the dependent variable. 
ROA is specifically selected as it is one of the most frequently used profitability measures 
in empirical research. Only the values for the third year prior to and the third year after the 
takeover are used to calculate the % change in ROA. The reason for not using a three-year 
average before and after the M&A, for example, is to have enough variation in the 
dependent variable. Any differences due to the M&A’s impact will be more noticeable by 
having a larger time period between the two values. 
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The following independent variables, which have been identified by past studies as 
determinants of the market’s perception of an M&A, are considered: buyer’s acquisition 
experience (BUY_EXP), total deal value (VALUE), three-year average pre-acquisition 
ROA (PREACQ_ROA), three-year average pre-acquisition EBITDA margin 
(PREACQ_EBITDA), three-year average pre-acquisition P/E ratio (PREACQ_PE), and 
three-year average pre-acquisition P/B ratio (PREACQ_PTB). Table 3 provides 
explanations for all of the independent variables used. The following specification is the 
complete regression model used in the analysis: 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑈𝑌_𝐸𝑋𝑃 + 𝛽3𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝑂𝐴 
+𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑃𝑇𝐵 
+𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽9𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀 (3) 
 
An efficient market should be looking at some or all of these independent variables, 
which are publicly available at the announcement day, to evaluate the prospects of an 
acquisition. For instance, M&A is a popular growth strategy for companies to increase their 
market share. At the same time, there can be cost reductions due to synergies and 
efficiencies in the newly combined entity. Hence, the acquirer’s average EBITDA margin 
(as % of total revenue) over the past three years could be used by the market as a predictor 
for the post-acquisition performance. EBITDA margin is a good measure as it includes 
both revenue growth and cost reductions. Similarly, ROA is one of the most discussed 
measures of business performance and can be used to assess the pre-acquisition 
performance and profitability of the bidder. Moreover, prior literature suggests that the 
acquirers’ P/B ratio is related to announcement returns, as it conveys important information 
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about pre-acquisition performance and potential future performance. Controlling for the 
acquirer’s past performance by including also reduces the potential of reverse causality. 
An industry classification variable (IND) is computed using the bidder’s Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code.3 Finally, year dummy variables (YEAR) are used to 
control for the economic environment and to remove any impact of the specific years in 
the sample (e.g. merger waves). The data in the sample is spanning 2010-2014, and so four 
dummy variables are generated (2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014). This allows for the results 
to be generalized to any time period and not only the 2010-2014. The GDP growth rate 
could have also been used to control for the economic environment. However, it cannot be 
used simultaneously with the year dummy variables due to collinearity. 
  
                                                 
3 Developed in the U.S. in 1937, SIC coding is a system for classifying the nature of a company’s business 
by a four-digit code (United States Department of Labor). The SIC codes can be grouped into ten broad 
groups: (1) Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; (2) Mining; (3) Construction; (4) Manufacturing; (5) 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, and Gas service; (6) Wholesale Trade; (7) Retail Trade; (8) 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; (9) Services; and (10) Public Administration. For each of these major 
industry groups, a classification variable is constructed, excluding Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, as 
the sample does not include acquirers that are financial companies (see selection criteria in section 3.1). 
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Chapter 4 
Empirical Results 
Equation (3) is used to run the following multiple regressions, and Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) are used to estimate the coefficients. Tables 4 and 5 provide full regression 
outputs for the two models using the BHAR and the change in ROA as the dependent 
variable respectively. 
4.1 Regression of BHAR on CAR 
In the first regression, the BHAR for the acquirer for the three-year period after the 
M&A acts as the actual performance variable from Equation (3). Figure 3 graphs a scatter 
plot of the three-year BHAR on the seven-day CAR for the acquirer. Table 4 reports the 
regression results, which suggest that BHAR is negatively related to the market’s initial 
reaction at the announcement. Specifically, if CAR increase by one percentage point, the 
three-year BHAR will be lower by 0.24 percentage points, on average. The negative 
coefficient indicates that the market is not effective in anticipating M&A performance. The 
M&A deals that the market is most optimistic about at the announcement actually do worse 
(in terms of the three-year BHAR) than those the market was less optimistic about. If the 
market’s anticipation about a merger is positive, it is more positive than what ends up 
happening. Still, this does not imply that returns will be negative, but it does suggest that 
returns will be lower from what the market expected them to be. If this is a negative 
reaction, it is going to be less negative. Therefore, the market overreacts to the 
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announcement of an M&A in either direction. The calculated t-statistic for CAR is -2.25, 
which makes it statistically significant at the 95% level. This is a signal of market failure 
and, therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis that the market anticipates the prospects 
of M&A correctly. 
Another noticeable observation is that the buyer’s prior experience in conducting 
M&As (defined as number of deals the buyer did in the three years before the 
announcement day) has a positive and significant effect on the actual performance of the 
merger. If the number of M&As conducted by the bidder during the three years prior to the 
announcement increases by 1, BHAR increases by 0.028 percentage points, on average. In 
other words, the more experienced the buyer is, the better the returns will be for the three-
year period after the takeover and vice versa. Moreover, the t-statistic is 7.44, suggesting 
that the buyer’s experience has a huge significance in explaining excess performance of 
the M&A. 
The coefficients on the dummy variables for 2011 and 2012 are negative, but 
insignificant. The coefficients for 2013 and 2014 are also negative, but significant at the 
95% level as well. If an M&A is conducted in 2013 or 2014, the three-year BHAR (after 
the M&A) will be lower by 0.23 and 0.17 percentage points respectively. In this study, 
three years following the M&A are used in calculating the BHAR for the acquirer. Hence, 
for M&As conducted in 2013 and 2014 the BHAR used extend up to 2016 and 2017, 
respectively. The overall U.S. stock market did really well during 2016 and 2017, making 
it harder for individual stocks to beat the market, and so abnormal returns (BHAR) 
decrease. This could help explain why the coefficients for 2013 and 2014 become 
statistically significant. 
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The results also indicate that the three-year post-acquisition BHAR for the acquirer 
is positively related to the acquirer’s pre-announcement price-to-book ratio. If a bidder is 
highly valued prior to the announcement, the subsequent three-year BHAR is going to be 
higher. The calculated t-statistic is very significant too. Generally, a high P/B ratio suggests 
that a company’s stock is highly valued. Thus, the higher the P/B ratio, the wealthier a 
buyer becomes. If a buyer is paying with their stock that is highly valued at the time of the 
acquisition, it is essentially less expensive for them to make the acquisition. Hence, a higher 
P/B ratio is going to be associated with higher returns. 
Lastly, if the acquirer is in the mining industry group, the BHAR is going to be 
lower. A possible reason for this result is that the data in the sample includes only U.S. 
companies, and many production companies have been shifting or transferring their 
operations to countries with lower production costs. Therefore, it is possible that the 
negative and statistically significant coefficient on Mining is driven by the companies who 
have not shifted their production to decrease their costs and experience lower returns for 
that. 
The overall low R-squared value (10.17%) indicates that there is a lot of variability 
in the dependent variable. 
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4.2 Regression of ΔROA on CAR 
The results when using the percentage change in ROA (3rd year post vs. 3rd year 
pre-acquisition) as the actual performance variable are consistent with those of the first 
regression. Figure 4 graphs a scatter plot of ΔROA on the seven-day CAR for acquirers. 
Table 5 provides full regression results, which seem to favor a negative relationship 
between CAR, the market predictor variable, and ΔROA, the actual performance variable. 
In particular, a one-percentage-point increase in CAR results in a ΔROA that is 0.77 
percentage points lower. The negative coefficient suggests that the market is not effective 
in anticipating M&A performance since a higher ROA indicates higher profitability, which 
is desirable and one of the reasons companies choose an M&A strategy. If the bidder enjoys 
higher CAR around the announcement day, there is going to be a larger negative change in 
the ROA three years prior to and three years after the acquisition. However, the calculated 
t-statistic is -0.72, which is not statistically significant at the 95% level, indicating that the 
market’s reaction does not explain what actually happens. 
Consistent with the result of the previous regression, the effect of the acquirer’s 
M&A experience on the actual performance of the M&A is positive and significant. 
Specifically, ΔROA is positively related to the number of acquisitions that the bidder 
conducted during the three years prior to the announcement. The calculated t-statistic is 
4.02, making the effect of the buyer’s experience significant at the 95% level. The findings 
suggest that if the bidder is more experienced by 1 additional M&A deal from the past, the 
change in ROA will be 0.062 percentage points larger. 
The results also indicate that the change in ROA for the acquirer is positively 
related to the acquirer’s pre-announcement P/E ratio. The calculated t-statistic is significant 
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too. Generally, a high P/E ratio suggests that investors are expecting higher growth in the 
future. Therefore, in this regression analysis, a higher P/E before the acquisition predicts a 
greater change in ROA. In other words, there is going to be growth in profitability. 
The R-squared value remained very low (4.45%) suggesting that there is a lot of 
variability in the dependent variable. 
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Chapter 5 
Concluding Remarks 
This empirical exploration provides valuable insights for investors to understand 
the relationship between announcement day market reaction and post-acquisition 
performance to make asset allocation decisions accordingly and potentially profit in cases 
when the market’s anticipation is wrong. Overall, the results of this empirical study are 
consistent with the investor overconfidence hypothesis and indicate that the stock market 
overreacts at the M&A announcement in either direction (either positively or negatively), 
and then corrects itself in the long-run. For example, the M&A deals that the market reacts 
very favorably actually end up not satisfying the market in terms of performance in the 
long-run. Another noticeable observation is that the experience of the acquirer has a great 
significance in explaining the excess performance of the M&A. 
The findings suggest that the actual long-term M&A performance is more 
positively related to the buyer’s experience rather than the market’s initial reaction or 
anticipation about the merger. The experience of the buyer is a better predictor. Thus, 
investors who follow a strategy of buying the stock of bidders that the market has reacted 
positively to the M&A announcement, actually end up worse off. For a one percentage 
point increase in the short-run CAR, three-year BHAR decrease by 0.24 percentage points. 
However, this study has some limitations. First, this analysis applies a linear 
regression to explain the relationship. Linearity explains only a fraction of the variation, 
and this is evidenced by the small R-squared value. This issue is left for further research, 
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possibly through an application of a different econometric model. Second, this approach 
does not take into consideration agency costs that can affect the outcome. This analysis 
only examines the results but ignores qualitative factors that could lead to increased costs 
or reduced results. Further research could take a case by case approach (case-study) to fully 
understand the different variables that are in play. However, this would require a 
significantly smaller sample. 
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Illustrations 
FIGURE 1. North American and European M&A Activity 
 
Figure 1 presents the estimated and realized deal value ($ billion) and deal count in North America and 
Europe by year for the 2008-2018 period. Data from PitchBook Data, Inc. 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. North American M&A Activity 
 
Figure 2 displays the total deal value ($ billion) and deal count in North America by year for the 2008-2018 
period. Data from PitchBook Data, Inc. 2018. 
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FIGURE 3. Scatter plot of BHAR on CAR 
 
The figure plots the three-year post-acquisition BHAR against the seven-day CAR for acquirers. A fitted line 
is also displayed through the scatter plot. STATA output; Data from WRDS 2019. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. Scatter plot of ΔROA on CAR 
 
Figure 4 plots ΔROA (3rd year post vs. 3rd year pre-acquisition) against the seven-day CAR for acquirers. A 
fitted line is also displayed through the scatter plot. STATA output; Data from WRDS 2019. 
 
 
  
TABLE 1. Summary Statistics – Event Study Returns & Transaction Details 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the 7-day and 3-year CTR, CAR, and BHAR. To calculate the three-year BHAR, there are approximately 756 trading 
days over three years. Summary statistics for the deal value and buyer experience are also provided. Buyer experience is defined as the number of previous 
M&A deals closed by the acquirer. Data is from WRDS 2019. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum Count 
 7-day returns 
CTR (-3 to +3 days) 1.54% 12.23% -42.11% 511.11% 3,208 
CAR (-3 to +3 days) 1.13% 10.36% -51.94% 421.79% 3,208 
BHAR (-3 to +3 days) 1.16% 11.81% -42.93% 511.13% 3,208 
 3-year returns 
CTR (+4 to +760 days) 50.50% 86.41% -99.87% 1,166.67% 3,208 
CAR (+4 to +760 days) 1.72% 55.93% -432.86% 318.61% 3,208 
BHAR (+4 to +760 days) 0.90% 83.43% -161.98% 1,098.03% 3,208 
 Transaction details 
Deal value 576.91 4,245.10 1.02 127,103.20 3,208 
Buyer experience 4.5 5.7 0 73 3,208 
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TABLE 2. Summary Statistics – Accounting Data 
 
The first half of this table (pg. 26) provides summary statistics for the return on assets (ROA), revenue, EBITDA margin, price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio, and 
price-to-book (P/B) ratio in the 3rd year prior to the acquisition and in the 3rd year after the acquisition. The second half of the table (pg. 27) provides summary 
statistics for the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition 3-year average return on assets (ROA), revenue growth, EBITDA margin, price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio, 
and price-to-book (P/B) ratio. Data is from WRDS 2019. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum Count 
 3rd year pre & 3rd year post-acquisition 
ROA (pre) 2.76% 21.63% -678.34% 72.24% 3,208 
ROA (post) 2.04% 17.50% -484.40% 282.76% 3,208 
ΔROA (post vs. pre) -89.35% 769.07% -14,102.02% 4,983.63% 3,208 
Revenue (pre) 7,963.90 26,501.88 0.00 425,071.00 3,208 
Revenue (post) 10,058.96 30,473.22 0.18 483,521.00 3,208 
EBITDA Mgn. (pre) 2.71% 268.06% -10,822.74% 86.53% 3,208 
EBITDA Mgn. (post) -6.91% 634.26% -27,075.43% 80.44% 3,208 
P/E (pre) 14.61x 99.27x -1,126.17x 2,024.00x 3,208 
P/E (post) 21.69x 180.23x -2,228.00x 4,854.00x 3,208 
P/B (pre) 2.96x 34.41x -299.91x 923.73x 3,208 
P/B (post) 1.35x 39.71x -1,099.94x 113.38x 3,208 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 2. (continued) 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum Count 
 3-year averages (pre & post-acquisition) 
Avg. ROA (pre) 3.79% 13.54% -298.60% 309.93% 3,208 
Avg. ROA (post) 2.52% 12.66% -308.70% 32.62% 3,208 
Avg. Revenue growth (pre) 24.01% 524.35% -67.91% 2,9476.90% 3,208 
Avg. Revenue growth (post) 11.12% 30.38% -58.78% 999.02% 3,208 
Avg. EBITDA Mgn. (pre) 9.87% 110.53% -3695.17% 77.85% 3,208 
Avg. EBITDA Mgn. (post) -3.31% 464.46% -18457.12% 75.86% 3,208 
Avg. P/E (pre) 13.81x 64.66x -864.38x 751.67x 3,208 
Avg. P/E (post) 17.63x 120.54x -906.54x 2585.11x 3,208 
Avg. P/B (pre) 2.50x 45.03x -1,343.43x 326.37x 3,208 
Avg. P/B (post) 2.32x 20.84x -512.22x 262.35x 3,208 
2
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TABLE 3. Definitions of Independent Variables 
 
 
Variable Description 
BUY_EXP 
Buyer’s M&A experience; defined as the number of deals closed by 
the bidder in the 3 years prior to the announcement day 
VALUE Total value of the M&A transaction ($ million) 
PREACQ_ROA Pre-acquisition 3-year average ROA 
PREACQ_EBITDA Pre-acquisition 3-year average EBITDA margin (as % of revenue) 
PREACQ_PE Pre-acquisition 3-year average P/E ratio 
PREACQ_PTB Pre-acquisition 3-year average P/B ratio 
IND Industry classification variable constructed using acquirer’s SIC code 
YEAR Year dummy variables (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) 
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TABLE 4. Regression of three-year BHAR on seven-day CAR 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the regression of ΔROA (3rd year post vs. 3rd year pre) on the seven-day CAR 
for acquirers. Buyer experience is defined as the number of previous M&A deals closed by the bidder. The 
independent variables ROA, EBITDA Mgn., P/E, and P/B are all averages of the three-year period prior to 
the M&A announcement. Statistical significance is denoted at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level 
(***). Data is from WRDS 2019. 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err. t-Statistic 
CAR -0.24209** 0.1076678 -2.25 
Buyer experience 0.0283102*** 0.0038032 7.44 
Deal value -2.50e-06 1.76e-06 -1.43 
Avg. ROA (pre) -0.0408824 0.1792862 -0.23 
Avg. EBITDA Mgn. (pre) -0.0092273 0.0227893 -0.40 
Avg. P/E (pre) -0.0001509 0.0001694 -0.89 
Avg. P/B (pre) 0.0008838*** 0.0001232 7.17 
Industry classification    
Construction 0.0561286 0.1940837 0.29 
Manufacturing 0.2477237 0.1846736 1.34 
Mining -0.4908884*** 0.1890388 -2.60 
Retail -0.0571632 0.2049539 -0.28 
Services 0.1082579 0.1871414 0.58 
Transportation 0.1789924 0.1901535 0.94 
Wholesale 0.1901166 0.1946848 0.98 
Nonclassifiable 0.3800955* 0.2272144 1.67 
2011 dummy -0.0401769 0.0497235 -0.81 
2012 dummy -0.0698461 0.0474205 -1.47 
2013 dummy -0.2309112*** 0.0414175 -5.58 
2014 dummy -0.1698476*** 0.0448351 -3.79 
Constant -0.1567085 0.1892332 -0.83 
N 3,208   
R2 10.17%   
Root MSE 0.79308   
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TABLE 5. Regression of ΔROA on seven-day CAR 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the regression of ΔROA (3rd year post vs. 3rd year pre) on the seven-day CAR 
for acquirers. Buyer experience is defined as the number of previous M&A deals closed by the bidder. The 
independent variables ROA, EBITDA Mgn., P/E, and P/B are all averages of the three-year period prior to 
the M&A announcement. Statistical significance is denoted at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level 
(***). Data is from WRDS 2019. 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err. t-Statistic 
CAR -0.7650016 1.068248 -0.72 
Buyer experience 0.0623204*** 0.0154841 4.02 
Deal value -4.11e-07 8.24e-06 -0.05 
Avg. ROA (pre) -0.1230515 0.5155799 -0.24 
Avg. EBITDA Mgn. (pre) -0.1451723* 0.0847706 -1.71 
Avg. P/E (pre) 0.0211918*** 0.0062423 3.39 
Avg. P/B (pre) -0.0012607 0.0013823 -0.91 
Industry classification    
Construction 2.005592 2.541919 0.79 
Manufacturing 3.66957 2.585646 1.42 
Mining 3.670248 2.734619 1.34 
Retail 4.523906* 2.647218 1.71 
Services 4.33693* 2.596498 1.67 
Transportation 3.610297 2.648802 1.36 
Wholesale 4.542653* 2.603826 1.74 
Nonclassifiable 4.379181* 2.623981 1.67 
2011 dummy -0.2961485 0.262114 -1.13 
2012 dummy -0.9835885** 0.460728 -2.13 
2013 dummy -1.515295*** 0.38256 -3.96 
2014 dummy 0.2028355 0.1864491 1.09 
Constant -4.743775* 2.646662 -1.79 
N 3,208   
R2 4.45%   
Root MSE 7.54   
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